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Abstract 
The refugee’s flows have alighted the European political debate boosting nationalistic forces in almost all 
countries. The aim of this paper is to show that the actual number of asylum seekers does not really allow to 
talk about a “refugee crises”. It argues, however, that the current European Union institutions and 
procedures are highly insufficient to manage successfully refugee’s inflows and asylum requests. A European 
foreign policy could have helped to prevent refugees’ inflows from war-thorn areas such as Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Eritrea, Libya and Syria. Once the problem is there, the procedures centred on the Dublin Convention are 
inadequate and the paper provides a few radical suggestions that are made for an EU-centred refugees and 
asylum seekers management and policy.  
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Is there a European refugee crisis? 
The European Union is at a crossroad, facing what Caporaso (2018) called the Europe’s Triple Crisis. Brexit, 
economic policies choices and the inability to successfully manage the snowballing inflows of refugees have 
substantially increased the share of euro-sceptics and put at risk the long-term project of European 
integration. The issue of migration and, specifically, of refugees and asylum seekers has probably been the 
most relevant issue that has alienated so many people from the EU as institution. 
In the European political debate, the inflows of refugees and asylum seekers have been described 
catastrophically, as it there was an endless number of individuals trying to enter with every means into 
Europe. Figure 1 shows data on both the number of journalistic and scientific articles returned by the query: 
‘European Refugee Crisis’, which we take as an indicator of how the refugee issue has been offered to the 
public. The trend shows that until 2014 the topic received almost no attention, while from 2015 the interest 
increased significantly, declining again from 2017 for journalistic articles and from 2019 for scientific articles4.  
Figure 1: Journalistic and Scientific Articles Related to the ‘European Refugee Crisis’ Research Query 
 
Source: Elaboration based on data from Google News and Google Scholar search engines. The figures for 2019 refer to 
the period between 01/01/2019 and 23/05/2019.  
                                                          
4 The time lag between journalistic and scientific articles is probably due to the long peer review process undertaken by 
the latter. 
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Since 2015, the situation begun to be narrated as a crisis by media5, politicians and academics for three main 
reasons:  
i. the increase in the arrival of asylum seekers;  
ii. the inadequacy demonstrated by the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in responding to the 
growing number of persons seeking international protection; and  
iii. the attempt by several political parties and leaders to gain electoral consensus by riding the issue of 
refugee inflows. 
While the CEAS has proven unable to cope with the increase of inflows (Bojadžijev and Mezzadra, 2015; 
Vitiello, 2016; Cellini, 2017; Bauböck, 2018a), we argue in the next section that the number of asylum seekers’ 
arrivals (and of persons granted protection) do not represent nor have represented in the past a critical 
amount, especially when considered from a global comparative perspective. For this reason, describing the 
European refugee situation in terms of crisis is wrong. The narration of a ‘European refugee crisis’, in fact, is 
not only a semantic issue since it is used to push European institutions to implement emergency policies, 
when it would have been wiser to introduce measures aimed at tackling the problem in a structural long-
term perspective.  
The present paper is structured as follows: the first section analyses some data to show how, if considered 
in a comparative perspective, neither the inflows nor the total stock of refugees hosted in Europe justify the 
alarmism used by several politicians and media. The second section examines the European legislation on 
asylum, critically analysing the Dublin system, the emergency measures and the EU foreign policy adopted 
from 2015 onward. The third describes the ineffectiveness of the emergency policies adopted by the EU, 
highlighting the risks they pose for the EU and for asylum seekers and refugees. Section four presents some 
concrete proposals to overcome the emergency logic addressing the refugee issue from a long-term 
structural perspective. 
                                                          
5 For an analysis of the way in which the crisis has been portrayed by a significant sample of European newspapers and 
media, see Tudisca, Pelliccia and Valente, 2019. See also Triandafyllidou, 2018. 
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The crisis is not only over, there has never been any crisis 
To understand the magnitude of the European refugee issue it is necessary to compare it at global level. 
According to UNHCR (2018), during the peak of the so-called "European refugee crisis", more than three 
million asylum applications were submitted worldwide. In the same year, the EU received about one million 
requests6, while the first six countries by number of requests jointly received 1,737,131 requests (Figure 2). 
It is important to stress that the number of asylum applications do not coincide with the number of 
disembarkations since many asylum seekers do arrive in Europe through more conventional means such as 
flights. 
Figure 2: Asylum Applications, Comparison Between the EU and the Six Largest Receiving Countries 
 
Source: Data from UNHCR (2018). 
 
The EU therefore received about one third of the total flow of asylum applications submitted globally. Table 
1 shows that the ratio between refugee flows and the total population of receiving countries is similar for 
                                                          
6 The UNHCR defines asylum seekers as ‘individuals who have requested international protection and whose 
applications for refugee status have not yet been completed, regardless of when they may have been submitted’. 
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the EU and other countries with massive inflows and it is substantially below countries such as Turkey and 
South Africa. There are certainly significant intra-European variations (reported in Table A4 in Appendix), 
with some countries, such as Greece and Cyprus where the ration of asylum application to total population 
is as high as 0.62 and 0.65, respectively, and other countries where it is close to zero. Even if the table reports 
a flow on the nominator (the number of asylum seekers) and a stock in the denominator (the total 
population), it nevertheless provides some useful comparative information. The EU ratio increased 
substantially in 2015 and 2016, but the decrease in 2017 indicates that the peak has apparently passed. 
Table1: Asylum Applications as a Percentage of the Total Population of the Receiving Countries (%) 
Country 2014 2015 2016 2017 
South Africa 0.85 1.99 0.39 0.34 
United States 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.20 
Turkey 0.14 0.27 0.31 0.38 
Malaysia 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.15 
Kenya 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.11 
Egypt 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 
European Union (EUR 28) 0.11 0.20 0.22 0.19 
Source: Elaboration on data from UNHCR (2018). 
Comparing the total number of refugees hosted by the whole EU with the number of those hosted by the six 
main hosting countries, a similar picture appears. Figure 3 shows how, in 2015, the EU hosted fewer refugees 
than Turkey and Pakistan and a similar number than Lebanon and Iran. 
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Figure 3: Number of Refugees Hosted, Comparison Between the EU and the Six Largest Hosting Countries 
 
Source: Data from UNHCR (2018). 
Comparing the percentage of refugees hosted on the total population of the hosting countries is even more 
significant since each nation might be more concerned about the stock rather than by the flow. As shown by 
Table 2, while refugees represented 0.26 per cent of the total European population in 2015, they represented 
18.8 per cent of the Lebanese population. In addition, among the largest hosting countries, the percentage 
of refugees hosted by the EU was the lowest in all the years considered. 
Table2: Hosted Refugees as a Percentage of Total Host Country Population (%) 
Country 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Ethiopia 0.68 0.74 0.77 0.85 
Iran 1.25 1.23 1.22 1.21 
Lebanon 21.42 18.80 16.65 16.42 
Pakistan 0.81 0.84 0.72 0.71 
Turkey 2.08 3.19 3.65 4.33 
Uganda 0.99 1.19 2.27 3.27 
EU 28 0.22 0.26 0.37 0.45 
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Source: Elaboration on data from UNHCR (2018). 
Data presented suggest that if there was a European crisis, it was not about the number of asylum seekers 
and refugees, but rather about the European management of asylum applications that has been unable to 
cope harmonically with the flows and to redistribute equitably the reception costs among member states. 
Looking solely at the European inflows (Figure 4), in 2015 member states received 2,700,000 asylum 
applications7, although they granted international protection to only 327,955 individuals; in the same year, 
according to the data provided by the Frontex agency, 1,822,177 individuals attempting to enter the EU 
untitled were detected along the EU's external borders. However, since the beginning of 2016, asylum 
applications, positive decisions and detections begun to decrease, and in 2018 both positive decisions and 
detections returned to 2013 levels, while asylum applications returned to 2014 levels. 
Figure 4: Asylum Applications, Positive Decisions and Detections of Illegal Border Crossing Points in the EU 
 
Source: Data on positive decisions and applications are from Eurostat (2018); data on detections are from Frontex 
(2018). 
The evidence discussed in this section, therefore, show that the narrative of the European refugee inflows in 
terms of crisis has been greatly exaggerated, and that the flows of asylum seekers have now returned to 
                                                          
7 Eurostat defines asylum seekers as “those who have lodged an application for international protection or who have 
been included in such an application as family members during the reference period”.  
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levels that we could define as routine for the EU.  There are, of course, long-term problems associated to the 
need to integrate socially and economically the refugees hosted, but this is a social policy problem. Why is it 
important to recognise that the narrative of the European refugee situation in terms of crisis is incorrect? 
And why is it essential not to treat the phenomenon in terms of crisis? The dominant representation has 
prompted both the EU and the member states to focus on implementation of emergency solutions and 
measures, such as relocation and resettlement schemes, and the hasty signing of agreements outsourcing 
the control of the EU's external borders to third countries, diverting the attention from the search for a more 
effective and consistent set of structural measures capable of responding adequately to the phenomenon of 
asylum seekers in Europe.  
The emergency policies implemented by the EU 
The CEAS is the set of rules concerning the management of refugees and asylum seekers, which establishes 
greater cooperation to ensure that asylum seekers are treated equally in an open and fair system throughout 
the EU. To address what was perceived and described as an incumbent disaster, since 2015 the EU has 
adopted several emergency measures that can be divided into two categories: those related to internal policy 
and those related to foreign policy and EU's relationships with third countries of transit.  
Concerning internal policies, the European Commission adopted the European Agenda on Migration in May 
2015, which included various strategies. Firstly, the Agenda identified a management method, called 
Hotspot, to support the member states affected by the increased flows of asylum seekers. The hotspot 
method involves training teams of specialists (made up of members of EASO, Frontex, Europol, EUROJUST 
and the authorities of the member states) who are called upon to quickly identify, register and take the 
fingerprints of incoming migrants. Secondly, the Agenda proposed the implementation of a relocation 
mechanism, whereby persons in clear need of international protection are identified in those member states 
at the forefront (Italy and Greece) and transferred to other member states where their asylum application 
will be processed. Finally, the Agenda provided the resettlement programme providing that for every Syrian 
national returned from the Greek islands another will be resettled to the EU directly from Turkey, replacing 
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irregular flows of migrants travelling in dangerous conditions across the Aegean Sea by an orderly and legal 
resettlement process. The financial burden of the Agenda was supported by the EU budget. 
Concerning foreign policies, the EU concluded a series of agreements with some third countries of transit 
with the aim of reducing asylum seekers flows: Turkey, Libya and Morocco. The EU-Turkey agreement was 
signed in March 2016 with the twofold aim of eliminating irregular migration flows from Turkey to Greece 
and improving reception conditions for refugees in Turkey. In return, the EU has pledged to support Turkey 
with a three billion euro funding for 2016-17 and a further three billion euro for 2017-19, to speed up the 
finalisation of the visa liberalisation agreement for Turkish citizens by streamlining the necessary procedures, 
and to resume and speed up negotiations for Turkey's accession to the EU. Turkey, on the other hand, has 
agreed to accept the return of all irregular migrants who arrived in Greece after 20 March 2016, to improve 
reception conditions for migrants and to work with the EU to improve humanitarian conditions in Syria 
(health, hygiene, protection), through the implementation of programmes aimed at responding rapidly to 
emergencies and new movements, with continued priority in besieged, hard to reach and displacement areas 
(European Commission, 2016; 2018a). 
The Italy-Libya agreement, concluded in 2017 and strongly supported by the EU, aims to combat illegal 
migration and human trafficking, and to strengthen Libyan borders’ security (De Guttry et al., 2018). Inspired 
by the EU-Turkey agreement, it represents a poor reproduction of its predecessor (Accorinti, Pugliese and 
Vitiello, 2019). The agreement provides for bilateral cooperation, financial and technical enhancement of the 
Libyan navy and coastguard, as well as the improvement of the conditions of migrants in Libyan detention 
camps (Nakache and Losier, 2017). According to Merelli (2017), the financial support should amount to 240 
million US dollars.  
The EU-Morocco agreement, negotiated within the framework of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 
aims at combatting human trafficking, reducing the entry of irregular migrants into Europe and improving 
the control of Moroccan borders. It provides to Morocco a financial support of €148 million (European 
Commission, 2018b). 
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The ineffectiveness of European policies and the emergency approach, and 
the risks associated with outsourcing the refugee problem 
 
The ineffectiveness of the European asylum policies and in particular of the so-called Dublin System is 
evident, and it has been reported both in the literature on the subject (Bojadžijev and Mezzadra, 2015; 
Vitiello, 2016; Cellini, 2017) and, more instrumentally, by politicians and journalists whenever an irregular 
landing occurred. But what are its actual limits? 
First, despite the efforts made by the EU, the objective of harmonising asylum procedures, reception 
conditions, and the programmes implemented by the various member states for those granted refugee 
status, is still far from being achieved (Guild, 2016; Becker, 2019). Considerable differences remain with 
respect to several aspects of  (see the tables in the Appendix) such as the timing required for the examination 
of asylum applications (Euractive, 2015), the percentage of positive decisions (Cellini, 2017), the conditions 
in which asylum seekers are held while waiting for the examination of their applications, as well as with 
respect to the integration policies implemented by the different member states (Wolffhardt, Conte and 
Huddleston, 2019). De facto, each country continues to maintain its own rules. This is an issue since it does 
not allow asylum seekers to benefit from equal conditions in all member states. 
Secondly, the rule according to which the first country of arrival is responsible for examining applications has 
contributed to worsen the situation, creating considerable hardship for member states, asylum seekers and 
refugees. From the member states perspective, this rule has ended up placing a disproportionate burden on 
the EU's external border states, such as Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Malta and Italy. This rule has had also negative 
effects on asylum seekers and refugees. As also shown by Table A1 in the Appendix, Member states continue 
to have different rules regarding the acceptance of asylum applications: in 2015, 56.8 per cent of applications 
were accepted in Finland, while Hungary only accepted 12.7 per cent. These differences have protracted also 
in the following years; Table 3 shows the acceptance rate of EU member states in 2018. 
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Table 3: Acceptance Rate of Asylum Requests by EU Member States and Associated Countries (2009-18) 
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Austria 21.7 25.0 30.9 28.0 29.6 76.3 71.3 71.6 55.8 43.5 
Belgium 20.2 21.6 25.6 22.7 29.4 39.6 53.9 60.3 52.3 50.9 
Bulgaria 41.9 27.2 31.4 26.6 87.5 94.1 90.6 44.3 35.8 35.1 
Croatia n/a n/a n/a 14.3 13.5 10.6 21.6 35.1 31.6 31.0 
Cyprus 29.3 17.4 2.7 7.9 20.6 76.2 76.8 65.8 50.8 49.1 
Czechia 18.9 35.0 46.7 24.3 38.3 37.5 34.5 33.5 12.2 11.2 
Denmark 48.0 41.0 36.7 36.2 40.3 68.0 81.3 68.4 34.4 50.1 
Estonia 20.0 37.5 16.7 18.2 18.2 36.4 44.4 68.4 61.3 26.7 
Finland 36.2 37.5 41.0 50.3 51.3 54.3 56.8 34.1 47.8 54.2 
France 14.3 13.5 10.9 14.5 17.3 21.6 26.5 32.9 29.4 28.4 
Germany 36.5 23.1 24.0 29.2 26.4 41.7 56.5 68.8 49.9 42.4 
Greece 1.1 3.0 2.1 0.8 3.8 14.8 41.8 23.7 42.7 47.0 
Hungary 21.6 25.0 17.3 31.8 7.9 9.4 12.7 8.4 30.9 38.0 
Ireland 4.0 1.6 5.5 10.6 17.9 37.7 33.0 22.8 85.9 85.5 
Italy 39.4 38.1 29.6 80.7 61.1 58.5 41.5 39.4 40.6 32.2 
Latvia 25.0 50.0 22.2 17.2 26.3 26.3 11.8 51.9 73.6 24.0 
Lithuania 27.6 7.9 8.2 14.1 31.4 37.8 47.2 69.6 77.0 50.0 
Luxembourg 23.7 14.7 3.4 2.4 10.4 13.6 23.9 61.0 65.6 71.9 
Malta 65.6 62.9 55.1 90.3 84.3 72.6 83.9 82.9 68.5 43.0 
Netherlands 46.9 45.5 43.3 40.3 48.9 66.8 80.4 72.1 49.0 35.2 
Poland 38.4 11.5 14.8 21.0 23.7 26.7 18.2 11.9 19.6 15.0 
Portugal 52.6 42.3 56.5 43.5 44.3 47.8 52.7 54.2 52.4 59.8 
Romania 21.3 16.5 7.0 14.2 63.8 46.7 36.4 62.2 60.3 45.9 
Slovakia 57.1 30.5 53.5 43.2 36.8 60.7 61.5 84.0 66.7 56.3 
Slovenia 16.7 21.7 9.5 16.7 17.9 47.4 34.6 64.2 62.5 42.6 
Spain 7.8 21.9 29.2 20.2 22.6 43.8 31.5 66.9 33.9 24.4 
Sweden 29.7 30.8 33.0 39.3 66.8 76.8 66.6 69.5 43.8 34.0 
United Kingdom 27.0 24.3 31.5 35.7 38.1 39.2 36.6 32.1 30.8 35.0 
           
Iceland 16.7 66.7 28.6 15.4 7.7 54.5 27.0 17.6 17.9 27.6 
Liechtenstein 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 11.1 0.0 16.7 60.0 62.5 25.0 
Norway 30.7 34.3 42.1 48.8 49.0 64.2 66.0 66.2 71.2 69.0 
Switzerland 56.5 52.0 45.2 25.7 38.5 70.7 64.1 58.4 90.0 89.6 
           
Average 28.9 28.3 27.0 27.9 33.9 46.0 47.2 52.5 50.0 42.6 
Coefficient of variability 54.9 56.6 57.6 69.6 60.7 48.1 45.6 38.3 37.4 41.1 
Source: Data from Eurostat (2018) 
 
Moreover, there is a rather strong contradiction between an EU based on the free circulation of people on 
the one hand, and the willingness to limit the mobility of asylum seekers on the other hand. The desire to 
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prevent secondary movements of asylum seekers makes it difficult for them to draw on their individual 
resources (such as having family and social networks in a specific EU country, mastering one of the various 
EU languages, having better professional skills to spend in one country rather than another) contributing to 
make refugees outlawed by force, obliged to escape the registration of fingerprints and to try to reach the 
chosen countries through illegal routes, running a whole series of risks endangering their lives (IOM, 2017).  
The emergency instruments implemented included: a) the resettlement, i.e. the relocation of a Syrian 
national from Turkey to EU territory for each Syrian national returned from Greece; b) the relocation 
mechanism, i.e. the transfer of asylum seekers from one European country (mainly Italy and Greece) to 
another; and c) the outsourcing of the EU borders’ control. All three instruments had limited impact. 
The resettlement programme, started in 2017, had rather minimal objectives, namely, to allow the safely 
arrival in Europe from third countries up to a total of 22,500 vulnerable refugees. 19,432 individuals have 
actually been resettled. The objective was achieved although the total number involved is much below what 
would be needed. Much worse the effectiveness of relocation, which ended in 2017 after more than two 
years. The set target was of 100,000 asylum seekers in total, a number insufficient to distribute equally 
asylum seekers across European countries. Despite the limited scope of the programme, only 34,000 people 
were relocated. Since less than a third of the target goal relocations have been concluded and that some 
countries (such as Poland and Hungary) have not participated, while other member states have participated 
less than the quotas allocated to them, it is clear that the relocation mechanism, which in the new 
programming will only be voluntary and probably even less effective, has failed.  
The strategy of externalising EU border control has been more effective, albeit only in reducing arrivals (Benli 
2018). As shown by the data provided by FRONTEX (2018), in fact, from 2015 to 2018 most routes have seen 
a significant reduction of detections in almost all the years considered. However, while detections on the 
central Mediterranean route have decreased considerably, those on the Western and Eastern Mediterranean 
routes have increased. The overall reduction of detections, as well as of asylum applications (shown in Figure 
4), is largely the result of the effectiveness of the agreements signed with third Countries of transit: Turkey, 
Libya and more recently Morocco. Nevertheless, while the policy of externalising the control of EU's external 
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borders appears to be somewhat successful from in reducing arrivals, it presents serious problems that 
should be considered, both for the EU and for migrants.  
The nature of the political regimes in Turkey, Morocco and Libya should be considered since none of them is 
respectful of human rights, even less of the human rights of asylum seekers. The fate of refugees who often 
flee from countries in the grip of civil war is, in short, put in the hands of other equally brutal regimes. This 
type of outsourcing poses three interlinked problems:  
i. The contradiction between outsourcing refugees to countries that do not respect human rights and 
the principles on which the EU is based; 
ii. The risk and in many cases the certainty that asylum seekers are put in a position where their human 
rights can be violated again; 
iii. The dependence that the EU creates to outsource the refugee problem to non-democratic countries. 
Articles 2 and 8, Title I and Article 21, Chapter 1, Title V of the Treaty on European Union are quite clear about 
the fundamental and founding role that democracy and respect for human rights play not only within the EU, 
but also in the way in which the EU projects itself outside its borders. None of the three countries has an 
effective human rights protection system. 
According to a recent report by Amnesty International (2018) Turkey is in a state of emergency about human 
rights violations, where dissent is strongly and violently repressed. With respect to the situation of migrants, 
the report points out that, despite some initiatives aimed at improving their situation, many of them do not 
have access to essential services nor to a clear procedure for determining their status. In addition, cases of 
forced returns of asylum seekers and refugees, including those from Syria, are continuously reported.  
In Libya, Amnesty International (2018) reports an even more worrying situation. At present, the three rival 
governments and their respective armed militias continue to commit serious and frequent violations of 
international law and human rights, with substantial impunity. All parties to the conflict carry out 
indiscriminate attacks in densely populated areas, leading to the killing of civilians. Migrants, refugees and 
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asylum seekers are subject to widespread and systematic human rights abuses and violations perpetuated 
by officers of detention centres, the Libyan coastguard and armed groups of human traffickers.  
Even in Morocco the human rights situation in general, and even more the rights of migrants, are very 
worrying. Amnesty International (2018) denounces that the authorities do not adequately investigate 
allegations of torture in detention centres. At the same time, migrants continue to face excessive use of force 
and detention. Finally, Moroccan security forces continue to participate to the summary expulsion of 
migrants and asylum seekers from the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. 
While this contradictory situation may therefore damage the EU's overall credibility in terms of respect of its 
very founding principles and may therefore potentially undermine the effectiveness of its foreign policy 
actions aimed at disseminating democratic practices and respect for human rights, this contradiction puts 
asylum seekers and refugees in a very dangerous position. In addition, the outsourcing of European border 
control puts the EU in a potentially vulnerable position. Concluding agreements with authoritarian regimes 
with poor transparency, accountability and respect of the rule of law make the EU in danger of blackmails. 
These countries have the possibility of opening their borders any time and to artificially create new refugee 
inflows in case of non-acceptance of their requests. 
Finally, the emergency approach and the lack of long-term structural policies expose the EU to the possibility 
that real or alleged crises may explode in the future whenever international conflicts, civil wars, natural 
disasters, or other kind of upheavals strike countries more or less close to the EU's external borders, since 
these are the determinants of the greatest flows of asylum seekers. 
Overcoming the emergency approach by implementing structural solutions 
 
The lack of effectiveness of the emergency policies implemented by the EU to face the refugee issue show 
the need to abandon the emergency approach in favour of a structural management approach capable of 
dealing not only with current problems but also with possible sudden new increases in flows. Table 4 reports 
the main differences in terms of actions and consequences of the emergency approach versus the structural 
management approach we here advocate. 
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Table 4: Approaches to Refugees Flows: Emergency Versus Management 
 Actions Consequences 
Emergency 
approach 
Containing inflows through 
refoulment 
International laws’ violations 
Increase of irregular inflows and 
trafficking 
Passing the buck across countries 
Tensions among member states 
Weakening of cohesion in the EU 
Borders’ control externalization 
Dependency on non-EU countries 
with poor human rights records 
Impeding secondary movements 
Increasing illegal trafficking and 
decreasing refugees’ integration 
chances 
Management 
approach 
Preventing international crisis through 
diplomacy, peace actions and 
economic aid 
Reducing asylum seekers’ inflows 
at source 
Standardization of EU regulations 
Creating a shared assessment 
procedure for the recognition of 
international protection 
Cooperation among EU countries in 
hosting and integrating refugees 
Increasing EU integration and 
reducing tensions among member 
states 
Granting free movement to refugees 
Reducing intra-EU illegal trafficking 
and facilitating refugees’ 
integration 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
 
Any attempt to overcome the emergency approach and to find long-term structural solutions should follow 
at least four trajectories:  
i. Reducing departures from countries of origin;  
ii. Ensuring a fair distribution of the burden among EU member states;  
iii. Ensuring the respect for human rights for asylum seekers and refugees both within the EU and in 
the framework of its relations with third countries;  
iv. Improving the management of asylum seekers and refugees. 
Reducing departures from countries of origin 
Large flows of asylum seekers, in most cases, are the effect of internal or international conflicts forcing 
individuals to leave their country of origin to escape the horrors of war. This is also confirmed for the 
European inflows of the recent decades: the Balkan wars of the 1990s, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
Syrian and the Libyan civil wars have generated the greatest number of asylum seekers. Figure 5 confirms 
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these claims illustrating how, from 2014 to 2018, most of the countries who generated the greatest flows of 
asylum seekers were devastated by wars and civil wars, and/or countries in which basic human rights are 
systematically violated. 
Figure 5: Asylum Applications in the EU by the 10 Largest Asylum Seekers’ Nationalities (2014-18) 
 
Source: Data from Eurostat (2018) 
Indeed, war is not the only cause of the phenomenon. Serious and systematic human rights violations, 
epidemics and natural disasters, as well as economic and social underdevelopment, are also at the root of 
asylum flows. However, war is often a sudden event that in a short time creates many people in need of 
international protection. It is clear, therefore, that in order to prevent large flows of asylum seekers, it is first 
necessary to prevent the outbreak of armed conflicts. Can the EU do it? 
Despite the progress made by the EU on the common security and defence policy, member states continue 
to enjoy a high degree of autonomy and different preferences. While respecting international law, member 
states have the power to intervene or promote military actions without any kind of scrutiny by EU 
institutions. But the EU has often to deal with the migratory consequences of such interventions afterwards. 
An example is the military intervention in Libya in 2011, authorised by the United Nations and initiated by 
France. The overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in the absence of a clear long-term strategy has left Libya in a 
highly fragmented condition, without a central government capable of controlling its entire territory. This 
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has resulted in a sharp increase in migration flows from Libya and the inability of the country to patrol its 
own inflows from other African countries. Similar situations also occur when the United States initiated 
military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both cases, many EU countries participated in the military action 
promoted by the Bush Jr Presidency, without being able to achieve internal peace and stability in these 
countries in the subsequent 15 years, which would have been the best condition to prevent refugee flows at 
source. 
The EU competence in such situations is severely limited by the powers conferred by the Treaties. While the 
EU has the possibility to undertake diplomatic actions, as well as certain types of military actions (peace-
keeping, peace-building, training of armies of third States, etc.), member states retain the right to undertake 
autonomous actions without the interference of the EU, and consequently of the other member states. All 
these military interventions were decided without paying any attention to the boomerang effect they would 
have generated: long-term civil wars and refugee flows for at least a generation. In order to address this 
tension, the EU should have developed more effective coordination regarding peace-building interventions 
in neighbouring areas or those areas that could create indirect effects such as new refugee flows. 
Obviously, this path is far from easy to follow. The main difficulty of such a proposal is that to give the EU 
decision-making power over the military interventions of member states would require a reform of the 
Treaties relating to foreign policy and common defence. However, the procedure for reforming the Treaties 
is extremely long and complex, especially since individual member countries have different preferences 
(Koenig-Archibugi, 2004). A second-best option would be to explicitly include in strategic decisions about 
military interventions also the risk of generating refugee flows. If this would have been done, it is likely that 
more efforts and resources would have been devoted to diplomacy, peacebuilding and peace enforcement 
rather than to military interventions.  
Ensuring a fair distribution of the burden among EU member states 
One of the most problematic and thorny aspects of the EU's overall and emergency strategy on the 
management of refugees and asylum seekers has been the lack of a fair distribution of the burdens arising 
from the management of international protection claims, as often denounced even before the so-called 
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refugee crisis (Barutciski and Suhrke, 2001; Noll, 1997; Thielemann, 2003). In the Appendix we try to 
document intra-EU differences. 
There are at least four reasons that explain the unequal distribution of refugees across member countries 
(Neumayer, 2004; Thielemann, 2004, 2018; Hatton, 2015; Zaun, 2018): 
i. The role of structural factors that would naturally increase the weight for some specific states. The 
existence of migrant networks, geographical location, historical or linguistic links are all elements 
that could increase the weight for specific countries; 
ii. The role of internal migration policies within states. Countries with more open migration policies 
would tend to attract more migrants as well as asylum seekers.  
iii. The role played by the Dublin System with its cornerstone that the first country of arrival should deal 
with asylum-seekers, which by itself generate an uneven distribution of burdens among the EU 
member states; 
iv. The increased propensity of member countries to become free riders in moments of increased 
refugee flows, deliberately choosing of not acting if they are not directly involved. This avoid 
governments to be under pressure by their electorates and often, governments’ refusal to cooperate 
could even lead to increase their internal consensus. In these conditions effective cooperation 
becomes impossible.  
Although all the arguments considered seem reasonable and worthy of consideration, the fourth, proposed 
by Tielemann (2018), explains very well why the EU has been unable to implement effective policies. This 
interpretation also suggests a possible way to impede free riding practices: implementing a binding European 
distribution system. If we consider the fact that all the policies implemented so far to try to redistribute more 
fairly the burden resulting from the flows of asylum seekers have failed, there is a need to move towards a 
binding system to achieve of the objective in question.  
Such a system should of course be based on the principles of solidarity and fairness between member 
countries and should ensure that each of them contributes to the management of the problem according to 
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its own resources and possibilities. In order to implement such a system, firstly, annual quotas of asylum 
applications to be processed should be established and allocated to each country. The quotas, always 
considering the principles of solidarity and equity, could be established based on certain objective 
parameters such as GDP per capita, growth rate, unemployment rate, the stock of refugees already hosted, 
and so on. Once the quotas have been set and made binding, the EU should establish a system that 
encourages member states to respect them, or rather that discourages them from not respecting them. In 
this regard, it could be implemented an infringement system similar to that used in the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) in the event of non-compliance with the macroeconomic parameters. In fact, as the failure to 
comply with these parameters is considered a risk for the resilience of the Euro and therefore for the EU 
itself, the European refugee issue also seems to represent a risk for the resilience of the EU, if for no other 
reason than the great impetus it has given to populist, nationalist and anti-European parties (Archibugi and 
Benli, 2017) in all member countries. It is fundamental, however, to provide also a mechanism allowing 
asylum seekers to choose the country in which to be relocated (Bauböck, 2018b) so as to facilitate their 
integration once their requests are received. 
In practice, the management of this system could be granted to the European Commission and the Council 
of Ministers in the Justice and Home Affairs formation, which on the one hand should be responsible for 
monitoring the compliance with the quotas and, on the other hand, should have the power to impose 
sanctions if member states do not comply with them. The procedure could be similar to that of the SGP, with 
three distinct phases: warning, recommendation and sanction. If a member state does not respect the 
quotas, the European Commission proposes, and the Council of European Ministers approves, an "early 
warning", followed by a real recommendation in case of non-cooperation. If, as a result of the 
recommendation, the State concerned does not cooperate, it may be subjected to an economic sanction.  
Ensuring the respect for human rights for asylum seekers and refugees both within the EU 
and in the framework of its relations with third Countries 
 
The EU was created to respect human rights internally and to promote them externally. However, the 
agreements on migration concluded with certain countries are very far from EU human rights standards. In 
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fact, these agreements have been concluded with countries where the respect for human rights and even 
more for asylum seekers is not guaranteed.  
Moreover, human rights violations against asylum seekers have also been reported within EU’s territory, as 
shown by both Amnesty International (2018) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR, 2017). For instance, Italy has been strongly criticised for the prolonged detention of asylum seekers 
in hotspots and for the lack of protection against the erroneous classification of asylum seekers as economic 
migrants. In addition, the UN Committee against Torture expressed strong concerns about the lack of 
safeguards against forced return of asylum seekers to countries where they would have been at risk of human 
rights abuses (OHCHR, 2017). In Hungary, several cases of excessive use of force against asylum seekers trying 
to enter the country have been reported. In France, violations of the right of non-refoulement have been 
reported for having returned Afghan citizens who were at risk of suffering human rights violations when they 
returned to their original country (Amnesty International, 2018). 
Concerning the respect for asylum seekers’ human rights in the context of the agreements signed with third 
countries, such as those with Libya, Turkey and Morocco, the EU could adopt at least three strategies. The 
first and most effective is to end these cooperation agreements when cases of violation of the human rights 
of asylum seekers are reported. The second is to establish permanent European offices in the territory of the 
third countries in question, with the task and the power of monitoring the respect of migrants’ human rights.  
The third strategy is to locate in these countries EU facilities that could assess the claims of asylum seekers 
and to decide when they status of refugees, providing them safe travel to the host country or safe return to 
their original country (European Alternatives, 2015). 
Concerning the issue of violations of the human rights of asylum seekers by EU member states, in principle 
the EU would have already the instruments to address them as it does for all human rights violations in its 
members, namely the suspension of the membership provided by Article 7 of the TEU. The European Council, 
through a 4/5 majority of its member countries, can declare that there are risks of serious violations of 
refugees and migrants’ human rights, so beginning the procedure. In more than one occasions, as in the case 
of France in 2009, Romania in 2012, Hungary in 2016 and Poland in 2017 (Fletcher, 2017) the possibility to 
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activate this mechanism has been discussed. However, it has never pursued the mechanism to the next stage, 
which required the unanimity of member countries, and which would have allowed to apply sanctions to the 
violating nations. Requiring unanimity to establish the actual violation, in fact, empties this instrument of any 
political credibility. 
Improving the management of asylum seekers and refugees  
To develop an asylum system more responsible and inclusive for member states and asylum seekers and 
refugees requires to overcome the differences between member states on asylum policies, as well as to 
overcome the rule of the first country of arrival and the impediment to secondary movements once refugee 
status has been granted. To do so, the EU should take stronger measures. 
An efficient and effective solution could be to reform the Reception Conditions, Procedures, and 
Qualifications Directives (Parusel, and Schneider, 2017). Based on the good practices implemented by the 
most virtuous states, such a reform should provide, first of all, a quick and timely examination of asylum 
applications, based on clear rules equally applied in each member state; secondly, it should provide for 
harmonisation of the rules on reception conditions for asylum seekers; and finally, it should ensure common 
programmes for the integration of refugees and their access to public services. 
To make the transition easier and, above all, to ensure a truly homogeneous application among the member 
states, the directives could be transformed into regulations. Unlike the former, the latter provide for detailed 
rules on matters falling within their competence and can be applied directly without the need for member 
states to convert them into national laws, thereby preventing member states from departing from EU 
standards. 
Finally, with respect to the possibility of granting refugees the right of free movement within the EU, which, 
as already mentioned would represent a huge step forward in European asylum policy, it would allow 
refugees a greater chance of integration and, together with the harmonisation proposed earlier, would 
eliminate the reasons behind the attempts of asylum seekers to escape registration on arrival in Europe. If 
each state were to guarantee the same procedures for examining applications and if, once refugee status 
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had been obtained, people could move freely within the EU, there would no longer be any reason to risk their 
lives by trying to escape registration and reach other countries by makeshift means or by relying on criminal 
networks.  
To implement such a measure, the EU could take several paths. In a minimalist perspective, it could include 
refugees among the beneficiaries of the right of free movement provided by the Schengen Treaty, creating a 
special European identity document granted for humanitarian reasons, recognised and valid throughout the 
EU; or, in a genuine cosmopolitan perspective (Hassner, 1998; Benhabib, 2005; Archibugi, 2008), it could set 
up a special European citizenship institute for refugees, which would not only include the right to free 
movement but would also give access to other rights, such as the possibility of voting in national and local 
elections in the countries in which they reside, or in European elections (Cellini, 2017b). In both cases, 
however, this would finally lead to the creation of a European asylum system that is specifically designed to 
guarantee the best possible conditions for refugees to integrate within EU territory. 
Conclusion: European Refugees strategy as an opportunity for European 
integration 
 
The European refugee situation in recent years has been described, narrated and addressed in catastrophic 
terms. Consequently, both member states and the EU have preferred to focus their efforts on the 
implementation of emergency solutions such as relocations, resettlement and externalization of EU borders 
control, rather than on the development of structural policies and instruments capable of tackling the 
situation in a long-term perspective.  
The simple data on asylum seekers and refugees flows we have reported show that the narrative of the 
refugee situation has been greatly exaggerated for political reasons. The problem in Europe with refugees, 
therefore, does not seem to stem from the exceptional nature of the inflows but rather from the inability of 
the CEAS to manage them in an orderly, secure and efficient manner and for the attitude of several member 
countries to struggle rather than collaborate among themselves. 
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We have described the main rules and instruments of the CEAS, as well as the emergency measures adopted 
by the EU both internally and externally. On the internal policies front, the CEAS is based on the Dublin 
Regulations and the Reception, Qualification and Procedures Directives. The Regulations establish which 
country is responsible for examining each individual asylum application, identifying it in the country where 
the asylum seeker first entered Europe. The Directives, on the one hand, aim to harmonise practices between 
member states by laying down a set of minimum common rules to all countries. Internal emergency measures 
such as relocation and resettlement schemes, on the other hand, were aimed at redistributing the burden of 
asylum flows from the most affected member states to those least affected by arrivals. On the external policy 
front, the EU has concentrated on formalising ad hoc agreements with certain third countries of transit with 
the aim of reducing the arrivals of asylum seekers on European territory. 
Our critical analysis of European policies indicate that they have been ineffective and inefficient on both the 
internal and external fronts. In particular, the paper shows how internal policies have been largely insufficient 
and, in some cases such as the first country of arrival rule, have contributed to accentuate the problems. At 
the same time, policies to externalise the control of the EU's external borders, while showing some 
effectiveness in limiting arrivals, have led to a situation where asylum seekers, refugees and migrants in 
general are placed in situations of serious and systematic human rights violations. 
We have suggested several long-term policies aimed at solving the problems raised by the EU's approach to 
asylum. The proposed policies follow four distinct but interlinked lines:  
i. Reducing departures from countries of origin;  
ii. Ensuring a fair distribution of the burden among EU member states;  
iii. Ensuring the respect for human rights for asylum seekers and refugees both within the EU and 
in the framework of its relations with third Countries;  
iv. Improving the management of asylum seekers and refugees. 
First, long-term policies should address the roots of the refugee problem. Since most asylum seekers come 
from countries ravaged by armed conflicts, often started by Western countries and supported by European 
25 
 
countries, the EU should be able to consider also the implications in terms of refugee flows over the military 
interventions of its member states. A special office coordinated by the High Representative of the Union and 
composed of foreign ministers of all member states could oversee these issues. While the decision to take or 
participate in military actions is currently a sovereign power of the member states, the consequences in terms 
of increased flows of asylum seekers and refugees have significant spill-over effects for all the EU which have, 
so far, totally been ignored.  
Secondly, it is necessary to address the imbalance between member states generated by European 
legislation, which currently puts uneven pressure on different countries. To do so, it is necessary to 
implement a binding European system for the distribution of asylum seekers, based on the principles of 
solidarity and fairness, and ensuring that each member state contributes according to its own resources and 
possibilities. To make this system effective, however, it is necessary to create disincentives that discourages 
states from not complying with it.  
Thirdly, the EU must monitor and promote respect for human rights both internally and in its relations with 
third countries of transit. As we have seen, there are reports about refugees and asylum seekers human 
rights violations both in countries with which the EU has specific agreements for the management of external 
borders and even in the member states themselves. Externally, the EU could adopt at least two strategies: i) 
to put an immediate end to such agreements when violations of human rights of asylum seekers are reported; 
and ii) to provide, within such agreements, for the establishment of Permanent European Offices with the 
power to monitor the respect for migrants’ human rights. Internally, it is strongly needed that the European 
Council is more assertive when member countries commit human rights violations against refugees and 
migrants. 
Finally, it is necessary to continue the harmonisation of asylum policies between member states, creating a 
European system that offers asylum seekers and refugees the same opportunities and the same rights 
throughout the territory of the Union. In this regard, it is necessary to reform the Reception, Procedures and 
Qualifications Directives, based on the best practices of the most virtuous states. Transforming directives 
into regulations could help the transition and make the system more effective because unlike the former, 
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the latter are directly applicable within the legal systems of the member states and therefore do not leave 
member states the option of departing too far from the common standards. In order to facilitate the 
integration of refugees and to prevent asylum seekers from using illegal and clandestine routes to move from 
one member state to another, it is necessary to grant refugees the right to free movement within the EU, 
eliminating the reasons behind asylum seekers' attempts to escape registration upon arrival.  
These proposals may appear highly unrealistic when refugees are often used as the scapegoat to cultivate 
nationalistic and xenophobic moods across all Europe. Rather than to please these feelings, a genuine 
European policy could show that the refugees are just a minor problem faced today by the EU, a problem 
that a farsighted and cohesive common strategy could successfully manage. A more active policy is certainly 
needed not only to defend refugees’ human rights, but also to prevent discrediting the overall EU values. 
  
27 
 
Appendix – Data on intra-EU Policies for Asylum Seekers 
 
Table A1: Procedures and Benefits for Asylum Seekers Across Some EU Countries 
Country Fast track 
procedure 
Refoulement Time limits 
for lodging 
application 
Monthly 
financial 
allowance 
(in euro) 
Freedom of 
movement 
restrictions 
Accommodation 
lack 
Austria yes yes no 40 yes no 
Belgium yes no 30 180 no no 
Bulgaria no yes no 0 yes no 
Croatia no yes 15 15 yes no 
Cyprus yes yes 6 320 yes yes 
France yes yes 21 204 yes yes 
Germany yes yes no 135 yes yes 
Greece yes yes no 90 yes yes 
Hungary no yes no 85 yes no 
Ireland no no 20 86.4 yes yes 
Italy no yes no 75 yes yes 
Malta no no no 130 no no 
Netherlands no no no 255.1 yes no 
Poland no yes no 12 no no 
Portugal yes no 182 269 no no 
Romania no yes no 104 yes no 
Slovenia yes yes no 18 yes no 
Spain no yes no 51.6 yes yes 
Sweden yes no no 204.5 no no 
United 
Kingdom 
no yes no 185.1 no no 
       
Average    166.7   
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data provided by AIDA (2018). 
Note: Fast-track border procedure provides a truncated asylum procedure with fewer guarantees for those individuals 
whose cases can be decided quickly; Refoulement is the practice, forbidden by the Geneva Convention on Asylum, 
according to which a country return an individual in a country where his life or freedom would be threatened; 
Monthly financial allowance is the sum in euro given to asylum seekers waiting for their application’s assessment. 
 
Table A2: Access to the Labour Market and to Education for Asylum Seekers Across Some EU Countries 
Country Labour 
access 
Labour access 
delay 
Maximum 
working period 
Children access 
to education 
Austria yes 90 180 yes 
Belgium yes 120 no yes 
Bulgaria yes 90 no yes 
Croatia yes 270 no yes 
Cyprus yes 30 no yes 
France yes 180 no yes 
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Germany yes 90 no yes 
Greece yes 1 no depending on 
location 
Hungary no no no yes 
Ireland yes 270 no yes 
Italy yes 60 no yes 
Malta yes 270 no yes 
Netherlands yes 180 168 yes 
Poland yes 180 no yes 
Portugal yes 30 no yes 
Romania yes 90 no yes 
Slovenia yes 270 no yes 
Spain yes 180 no yes 
Sweden yes 1 no yes 
United Kingdom yes 365 no yes 
     
Average  147.3   
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data provided by AIDA (2018). 
Note: Labour access delay is the number of days an asylum seeker must wait before being allowed to enter the labour 
market; Maximum working period is the maximum number of days an asylum seeker can work while waiting for the 
assessment of its request. 
 
Table A3: Detention, Residence and Citizenship for Asylum Seekers Across Some EU Countries 
Country Asylum seekers 
detained during a 
regular procedure 
Maximum 
detention 
period set in 
the law 
Average 
detention 
time 
UNHCR 
and/or NGOs 
access to 
reception 
centres 
Residence 
permits 
duration 
(years) 
Minimum 
period for 
obtaining 
citizenship 
(years) 
Austria rarely 540 n/a with 
limitations 
3 10 
Belgium rarely 182 n/a yes 5 5 
Bulgaria rarely no 196 with 
limitations 
5 3 
Croatia rarely 180 90 yes 5 8 
Cyprus rarely 540 180 yes 3 5 
France rarely 90 13 yes 10 none 
Germany never 540 n/a with 
limitations 
3 8 
Greece frequently 90 90 yes 3 3 
Hungary frequently 180 40 with 
limitations 
3 3 
Ireland Never 7 n/a with 
limitations 
1 3 
Italy rarely 360 32.8 with 
limitations 
5 5 
Malta rarely 270 97 with 
limitations 
3 10 
Netherlands rarely 540 44 yes 5 5 
29 
 
Poland frequently 180 97 yes 3 7 
Portugal never 60 60 yes 5 6 
Romania never 60 n/a yes 3 4 
Slovenia rarely 120 n/a with 
limitations 
10 5 
Spain Never 60 4 with 
limitations 
5 5 
Sweden rarely 360 29 yes 3 4 
United 
Kingdom 
rarely 7 n/a with 
limitations 
5 6 
       
Average  245.3 74.8  4.2 5.7 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data provided by AIDA (2018). 
Note: minimum period for obtaining citizenship is the minimum number of years a foreign must live in the country in 
order to be able to obtain the country’s citizenship. 
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